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1 Introduction
A.-A. Cournot considered best response dynamics long before the expression “game theory”
came into use. Such processes were studied in various contexts since then (Topkis, 1979, 1998;
Moulin, 1984; Vives, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1991; Kandori and Rob, 1995). Monderer and
Shapley (1996) started a similar approach to better reply dynamics.
This paper continues the search for natural classes of strategic games where the acyclicity, in
a stronger or weaker sense, of (coalition or individual) improvements is ensured (Rosenthal, 1973;
Germeier and Vatel’, 1974; Sela, 1992; Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Milchtaich, 1996; Holzman
and Law-yone, 1997; Konishi et al., 1997; Kukushkin, 1999, 2000, 2002ab, 2004ab, 2006, 2007bc;
Friedman and Mezzetti, 2001; Kukushkin et al., 2005). Unlike most of the previous literature,
we only consider game forms, i.e., we put no restrictions on the preferences of the players, only
on strategic interactions.
The topic is somewhat related to the study of consistent, or solvable, game forms (Gurvich,
1975, 1988; Moulin, 1976; Peleg, 1978; Abdou 1995, 1998; Abdou and Keiding, 2003; Boros et
al., 2007); however, the acyclicity of improvements is a much stronger (and rarer) property than
just the existence of an equilibrium.
In the case of two players, a kind of complete description of game forms where all individual
improvement paths in all derivative games lead to Nash equilibria was obtained by Boros et
al. (2008ab); for more than two players, there is no clear prospect for that. Weaker notions of
acyclicity of individual improvements result in wider classes of game forms, also without clear
prospects for a characterization. The most interesting and important class of game forms with
acyclic individual improvements is that of games with perfect information (Kukushkin, 2002a);
the results of that paper are somewhat extended here. Similar properties of “ordered voting
game forms” (Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 3.6) are also established; such game forms have been
considered before (e.g., Moulin, 1980, Kukushkin, 1995, or Mariotti, 2000), but improvement
dynamics in them seem to have never been studied.
Concerning coalition improvements, a complete description of game forms where all such
improvement paths in all derivative games lead to strong equilibria is obtained; not surprisingly,
there are not so many of them (Theorem 4.2). A slight weakening of the requirement widens
the class significantly. It is shown that “voting by veto” procedures (Mueller, 1978; Peleg, 1978)
generate game forms where the convergence of coalition improvements to strong equilibria is
ensured if the players restrict themselves to “minimal” strategy changes (Theorem 4.10).
In Section 2 the basic definitions concerning improvement dynamics in finite strategic games
are given; the notion of a game form is introduced and examples of game forms ensuring the
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acyclicity of improvements are provided. Section 3 contains some general results about game
forms with acyclic individual improvements; the class of “ordered voting game forms” is defined.
Subsection 3.2 is about games with perfect information; Subsection 3.3, about exact potential,
a cardinal analog of acyclicity. Section 4 contains the characterization of game forms with
acyclic coalition improvements; in Subsection 4.2, voting by veto procedures are defined and
their interesting properties proven.
2 Basic Notions
2.1 Improvement paths in strategic games
Our basic model is a finite strategic game with ordinal preferences. It is defined by a finite
set of players N (we denote n = #N), and finite strategy sets Xi and ordinal utility functions
ui : XN → R, where XN =
∏
i∈N Xi, for all i ∈ N . We denote N = 2N \{∅} (the set of potential
coalitions) and XI =
∏
i∈I Xi for each I ∈ N ; instead of XN\{i} and XN\I , we write X−i and
X−I , respectively. If n = 2, then −i refers to the partner of player i.
Remark. Whenever vi : R → R is strictly increasing, the functions ui and vi ◦ ui represent
the same ordering. Therefore, any meaningful definition, condition, statement, etc., involving
ordinal utility functions must be invariant to strictly increasing transformations. Auxiliary
constructions, however, may well use numeric values.
With every strategic game, a number of improvement relations on XN are associated (i ∈ N ,
I ∈ N , yN , xN ∈ XN):
yN BIndi xN ­ [y−i = x−i & ui(yN) > ui(xN)]; (2.1a)
yN BInd xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN BIndi xN ] (2.1b)
(individual improvement relation);
yN BsCoI xN ­
[
y−I = x−I & ∀i ∈ I [ui(yN) > ui(xN)]
]
; (2.2a)
yN BsCo xN ­ ∃I ∈ N [yN BsCoI xN ] (2.2b)
(strong coalition improvement relation);
yN BwCoI xN ­
[
y−I = x−I & ∀i ∈ I [ui(yN) ≥ ui(xN)] & ∃i ∈ I [ui(yN) > ui(xN)]
]
; (2.3a)
yN BwCo xN ­ ∃I ∈ N [yN BwCoI xN ] (2.3b)
(weak coalition improvement relation).
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Defining the best response correspondence Ri : X−i → 2Xi for each i ∈ N in the usual way,
Ri(x−i) = Argmax
xi∈Xi
ui(xi, x−i)
for every x−i ∈ X−i, we may introduce one more relation:
yN BBRi xN ­ [y−i = x−i & xi /∈ Ri(x−i) 3 yi]; (2.4a)
yN BBR xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN BBRi xN ] (2.4b)
(best response improvement relation).
It is often convenient to speak of just “an improvement relation” B without specifying which
of the above-defined relations is meant. A maximizer of an improvement relation B, i.e., a
strategy profile xN ∈ XN such that yN B xN holds for no yN ∈ XN , is an equilibrium: a
Nash equilibrium if B is BInd; a (“very”) strong equilibrium if B is BsCo (BwCo). Every Nash
equilibrium is a maximizer of BBR. If Ri(x−i) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, then the converse
statement is also true; in a finite game, the condition holds automatically.
Following Kukushkin (2004a), we consider an arbitrary binary relation B on a finite set X.
An improvement path (for B) is a (finite or infinite) sequence {xk}k=0,1,... such that xk+1 B xk
whenever k ≥ 0 and xk+1 is defined. A finite improvement cycle is an improvement path
x0N , x
1
N , . . . , x
m
N = x
0
N (m > 0); a relation is acyclic if it admits no finite improvement cycle.
On a finite set, that property is equivalent to the impossibility of an infinite improvement
path; therefore, every improvement path, if continued whenever possible, reaches a maximizer
(equilibrium) in a finite number of steps.
It is easy to see that a binary relation B on a finite set X is acyclic if and only if it admits
a numeric potential, i.e., a function P : X → R such that
∀y, x ∈ X [y B x⇒ P (y) > P (x)]; (2.5a)
the property is also equivalent to the existence of an order potential, i.e., an irreflexive and
transitive binary relation Â on X such that
∀y, x ∈ X [y B x⇒ y Â x]. (2.5b)
The relation B is weakly acyclic if every x ∈ X is connected to a maximizer of B with
an improvement path, i.e., there is a finite improvement path {x0, . . . , xm} (m ≥ 0) such that
x0 = x and xm is a maximizer. The weak acyclicity does not exclude the possibility that an
improvement process may continue indefinitely without reaching an equilibrium; however, this
is improbable under reasonable assumptions (Kalai and Schmeidler, 1977; Milchtaich, 1996;
Friedman and Mezzetti, 2001).
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Clearly, acyclicity implies weak acyclicity, which, in turn, implies the existence of a maximizer
of B. Neither statement can be reversed.
An essential feature of the improvement relations in a strategic game defined by (2.1)–(2.4)
is their disjunctive structure, reflected in (2.1b), etc. It allows us to introduce an intermediate
class of properties. We consider an abstract relation B with a disjunctive structure, i.e., assume
that there are a finite set M (in strategic games, M = N for individual improvements and
M = N for coalition improvements) and binary relations Bi on X for each i ∈ M such that
y B x ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈ M [y Bi x] for all y, x ∈ X. We say that B is acyclic under restrictions if
there are binary relations B> and B>i on X such that, for all i ∈M and y, x ∈ X, there holds
y B>i x⇒ y Bi x; (2.6a)
∃y ∈ X [y Bi x]⇒ ∃z ∈ X [z B>i x]; (2.6b)
y B> x ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈M [y B>i x]; (2.6c)
B> is acyclic. (2.6d)
If B is acyclic, then all conditions (2.6) are satisfied by B itself as B>, i.e., B is acyclic under
restrictions. In any case, the conditions (2.6a) and (2.6b) imply that every improvement path
of B> is an improvement path of B and both relations have the same maximizers. It follows
immediately that a relation acyclic under restrictions is weakly acyclic. When B is acyclic
under restrictions, an order potential of B> may be called a restricted order potential of B [cf.
Proposition 6.4 of Kukushkin (2004a)].
Restricted acyclicity means that it is possible to impose restrictions on each player’s (or
coalition’s) strategy changes so that whenever an improvement is possible, an admissible im-
provement is possible as well, and the convergence to an equilibrium is ensured. When an
improvement relation is only weakly acyclic, an agreement between the players as to who is
allowed to improve at each stage may be needed. (Explicit cooperation can be replaced with a
stochastic choice of the player or coalition to move at each step.) The example in Section 7.7
of Kukushkin (2004a) clarifies the difference between the weak acyclicity and acyclicity under
restrictions.
The (weak or restricted) acyclicity of the individual improvement relation BInd (2.1) in a finite
strategic game Γ is called the (weak or restricted) finite individual improvement property ((weak
or restricted) FIP) of Γ. Similarly, the (weak or restricted) finite coalition improvement property
((weak or restricted) FCP) refers to the strong coalition improvement relation BsCo defined by
(2.2); the (weak or restricted) FCP+, to the weak coalition improvement relation BwCo defined
by (2.3); the (weak or restricted) FBRP, to the best response improvement relation BBR defined
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by (2.4). It is easy to see that the following implications hold:
FCP+ ⇒ FCP ⇒ FIP ⇒ FBRP
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
restricted FCP+ ⇒ restricted FCP ⇒ restricted FIP ⇐ restricted FBRP
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
weak FCP+ weak FCP weak FIP ⇐ weak FBRP
.
Actually, the FBRP is a restricted FIP.
These properties admit the same dynamic interpretation as the (weak or restricted) acyclicity
of an abstract binary relation. The FCP(+), FIP, or FBRP ensure that all appropriate adaptive
dynamics converge to an equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The weak FCP(+), weak FIP,
or weak FBRP ensure the convergence to an appropriate equilibrium in a finite number of steps
with probability one under reasonable assumptions. The properties are also conducive to the
convergence of more sophisticated scenarios (Young, 1993; Kandori and Rob, 1995; Friedman
and Mezzetti, 2001).
Remark. According to Proposition 6.4 of Kukushkin (2004a), weak and restricted FBRP are
equivalent for two person games; unfortunately, neither property seems natural for game forms,
which are the subject of this paper. The equivalence does not hold w.r.t. the FIP or FCP(+).
2.2 Game forms
A game form G is defined by a finite set of players N , a finite strategy set Xi for each i ∈ N , a
finite set of outcomes A and a mapping g : XN → A, where XN =
∏
i∈N Xi is the set of strategy
profiles. For notational simplicity, we assume Xi ∩ Xj = ∅ whenever i 6= j; the assumption is
obviously innocuous. We denote X = ⋃i∈N Xi.
Once preferences of the players over the outcomes are specified (and we always assume this
to be done with ordinal utilities υi : A→ R), a derivative game G(υN) (where υN denotes a list
〈υi〉i∈N) emerges, in which the set of players is N , the strategy sets are Xi’s and utilities are
ui(xN) = υi(g(xN)).
If every derivative game G(υN) possesses a Nash (strong) equilibrium, G is called Nash
(strong) consistent. We say that G has the FIP, FCP or FCP+) if so does every derivative
game G(υN). We also use the expression G is an FIP, or FCP(
+) game form. If G has the FIP
(FCP), then G is Nash (strongly) consistent; the converse statements are wrong.
Remark. FBRP game forms could be defined quite similarly; however, there is no example of
an FBRP game form without the FIP. Moreover, Corollary 2 from Kukushkin (2007a) shows
that the FIP and FBRP are equivalent as properties of two person game forms.
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Example 2.1. Let us consider four game forms with two players:
a.
a a ab b b
c c c
 b.
a a ab c c
b d e
 c.
a a aa b b
a b c
 d.
a a ca b b
c b c
.
It is easily seen that each of them has the FIP, but only the first has FCP (and FCP+ at that).
Example 2.2. Let us consider two game forms with two players:
a.
a a aa b c
a d e
 b.
a a aa b a
a a b
.
It is easily checked that both game forms are Nash consistent; actually, the northwestern corner
is a Nash equilibrium for all utilities. Meanwhile, the underlined strategy profiles form an
improvement cycle for appropriate utilities in either game form, hence neither has the FIP.
However, there is an important difference between them.
Suppose that the utilities of the players in the first game form satisfy these inequalities:
υ1(b) > υ1(e) > υ1(d) > υ1(c) > υ1(a) and υ2(c) > υ2(d) > υ2(b) > υ2(e) > υ2(a). The
northwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium; an agreement to choose it is self-policing
in the usual sense. On the other hand, an agreement not to choose equilibrium strategies is
self-policing as well: if I believe that my partner honors the agreement, I have no incentive to
cheat. Moreover, each player would prefer the second agreement, which ensures the choice of
one of the underlined outcomes, to the first, notwithstanding the fact that the resulting outcome
remains unpredictable. The “irrelevance of equilibria” of this kind was discussed by Kreps (1990,
pp. 416-417). Example 1.3 in Kukushkin (2002b) demonstrates a similar problem concerning
strong equilibria.
One could argue that the second agreement is just to choose a mixed equilibrium; note,
however, that our players have ordinal preferences, hence they need not be able to compare
probability distributions on the set of outcomes. More technically speaking, a mixed equilib-
rium whose support consists of the underlined strategy profiles exists for every pair of utility
functions representing the same preferences, but its probability distribution is not invariant
under monotonic transformations.
No such ugly thing may happen when a game has the FIP or FCP(+); actually, the weak
FIP or weak FCP(+) is sufficient (Theorems 3.1–3.3 of Kukushkin, 2002b). The second game
form has the weak FIP, hence is immune to this pathology at least.
Remark. No game form is known such that every derivative game has the weak FIP or weak
FCP(+), but not necessarily a restricted FIP or FCP(+).
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The notion of restricted acyclicity admits a strengthening when applied to game forms.
An admissible change (by coalition I ∈ N ) relation is a binary relation `I on XN such that
x−I = y−I whenever xN `I yN . When I = {i}, we use the notation `i. Such a relation is liberal
if
∀xN , yN
[
[y−I = x−I & g(yN) 6= g(xN)]⇒ ∃zN [xN `I zN & g(zN) = g(yN)]
]
, (2.7)
i.e., if every change of outcome available to a coalition (or a player) can be done in an admissible
way.
A game form G has an almost unrestricted FIP if there is a list of admissible change rela-
tions 〈`i〉i∈N such that every `i is liberal and, in every derivative game G(υN), the admissible
improvement relation B> defined by (2.6c) with M = N and
yN B>i xN ­ [xN `i yN & yN BIndi xN ] (2.8)
is acyclic. A game form G has an almost unrestricted FCP if there is a list of admissible
change relations 〈`I〉I∈N such that every `I is liberal and, in every derivative game G(υN), the
admissible improvement relation B> defined by (2.6c) with M = N and
yN B>I xN ­ [xN `I yN & yN BsCoI xN ] (2.9)
is acyclic. Naturally, an almost unrestricted FIP (FCP) of a game form ensures the existence of
a (strong) Nash equilibrium in every derivative game, but it is much more than that.
Remark. The game form in Example 2.2b has an almost unrestricted FCP although it seems
not to be covered by Theorems 3.6 or 3.13 or 4.10 below.
The notion admits a more concrete interpretation. We may assume that there are costs
associated with every change of strategy and that a change is admissible if its cost is minimal
among all changes leading to the same outcome. To be more formal, we define a quasidistance
on XI as a mapping δ : XI ×XI → N ∪ {+∞} such that δ(xI , yI) ≤ δ(xI , zI) + δ(zI , yI) for all
xI , yI , zI ∈ XI . When an almost unrestricted FIP is concerned, only singleton I are needed,
naturally. Given a family of quasidistances on XI parameterized with x−I ∈ X−I , we define an
admissible change relation by
xN `I yN ­
[
y−I = x−I & @zI ∈ XI [g(zI , x−I) = g(yN) & δx−I (xI , zI) < δx−I (xI , yI)]
]
. (2.10)
Since XI is finite, (2.7) holds, i.e., the relation is liberal. Therefore, a list of quasidistances on
all XI (Xi) generates an admissible improvement relation B>, based on (2.10), (2.9) or (2.8),
and (2.6c) with M = N or M = N , in every derivative game G(υN).
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Proposition 2.3. A game form G has an almost unrestricted FCP (FIP) if and only if there
is a family of quasidistances δx−I (δx−i) on each XI (Xi) such that the admissible improvement
relation B> generated in every derivative game G(υN) is acyclic.
Proof. Sufficiency is tautological. Let G have an almost unrestricted FCP with an admissible
improvement relation B>. For each I ∈ N , we define `∗I as the transitive closure of `I , and
δx−I (xI , yI) = 0 if (xI , x−I) `∗I (yI , x−I) while δx−I (xI , yI) = +∞ otherwise. Clearly, every δx−I
is a quasidistance. Now (2.10) with this family δx−I defines `∗I ; in every derivative game, (2.9)
defines the admissible improvement relation B>∗I , which is the transitive closure of B>I ; therefore,
B>∗ is acyclic too. The case of an almost unrestricted FIP is treated in the same way.
In the following theorems, we always define admissible changes through quasidistances, i.e.,
“costs,” which look reasonable in each case.
A fragment G′ of G is a game form with the same set of players N , nonempty subsets
∅ 6= X ′i ⊆ Xi for all i ∈ N , and the restriction of g to X ′N as g′. If G has the FIP (FCP), then
so does every fragment of G; (strong) Nash consistency, or even a restricted FIP (FCP), need
not be “inherited” in this sense.
3 FIP Game Forms
3.1 Simple and ordered voting game forms
A game form G is separable if it is possible to define a “pointer” mapping p : X → A such that
g(xN) ∈ {p(xi)}i∈N (3.1)
for every xN ∈ XN . In principle, the same g may be described by (3.1) with different mappings
p; moreover, some p(xi) may be arbitrary. An interpretation should be clear: choosing a strategy
xi, player i as if expresses a wish to see p(xi) chosen; the mapping g determines whose desire
will be fulfilled at each strategy profile.
Remark. The term is due to Vladimir Gurvich (a seminar presentation). Boros et al. (2008b)
suggest “assignable game forms”; however, the inevitable association with the “assignment prob-
lem” appears undesirable.
Hypothesis 3.1. Every FIP game form is separable.
The converse implication is obviously wrong. Every game form in Examples 2.1 and 2.2 is
separable. For n = 2, the statement is proven in Boros et al. (2008b).
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The simplest separable game forms are dictatorial ones, where there is a player i ∈ N such
that g(xN) = p(xi) for all xN ∈ XN ; see Example 2.1a. Unless g(XN) is a singleton, there
cannot be more than one dictator; p(xj) for j 6= i may be arbitrary.
A game form is simple if it is separable and there is a linear order on X such that
g(xN) = p(min
i∈N
xi) (3.2)
for every xN ∈ XN . (Again, the same g may be described by (3.2) with different orders on X .)
Besides a desirable outcome, every strategy specifies a priority of the desire; then the choice
with the highest priority is implemented. If G is dictatorial, we may define xi < xj for every
strategy of the dictator i and all j 6= i. Every fragment of a simple game form is simple as well.
Remark. Boros et al. (2008ab) call such game forms “totally reducible”; however, a lone ad-
jective seems preferable.
Given a game form, we call xi ∈ Xi simple if #g(xi, X−i) = 1.
Proposition 3.2. A game form G is simple if and only if there is a simple strategy in every
fragment of G.
Proof. If G is simple and G′ is a fragment of G, we pick the minimal strategy in
⋃
i∈N X
′
i; (3.2)
immediately implies that it is simple in G′. Conversely, we pick a simple strategy in X and
declare it the least in X ; then we forget it and define a linear order on X by induction.
Theorem 3.3. Every simple game form has the FIP.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that x0N , x
1
N , . . . , x
m
N = x
0
N (m > 0) is an individual improvement
cycle in a derivative game G(υN). Without restricting generality, we may assume that there
is no shorter improvement cycle. For each i ∈ N , we define X ′i = {x0i , x1i , . . . , xm−1i }. By
Proposition 3.2, the fragment contains a simple strategy; let it be xki . Without restricting
generality, we may assume that xkN BIndi xk−1N , hence xk+1N BIndj xkN with j 6= i. Since xki =
xk+1i and x
k
i is simple, we have g(x
k
N) = g(x
k+1
N ), which contradicts the supposed inequality
uj(x
k+1
N ) > uj(x
k
N).
All game forms in Example 2.1 except the last one are simple. Theorem 5 of Boros et al.
(2008a) shows that every two person game form which has the FIP but is not simple must
contain that matrix. When n > 2, even that much cannot be asserted, see Example 4.8 below.
“Dually” to dictatorial game forms, priorities of the strategies may be determined by the
outcomes pointed to. Let A be linearly ordered and
g(xN) = min
i∈N
p(xi) (3.3)
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for each xN ∈ XN ; Example 2.1c presents such a game form. A possible interpretation: each
player chooses a maximal “level of cooperation” she is ready to accept; then the highest level
acceptable to everybody becomes the norm. The term unanimity game forms may be appropri-
ate.
Proposition 3.4. Every unanimity game form has the FIP.
Proof. The game form is simple: yi > xj whenever p(yi) > p(xj); the strategies with the same
p(xi) are ordered arbitrarily. Now Theorem 3.3 applies.
Generalizing the notion, we may assume that an outcome is socially acceptable if a certain
fraction of players finds it so; the median is most usual in political sciences. Moulin (1980)
considered such game forms, with the addition of “fixed votes” to the players’ choices, and
established some nice properties of them when the preferences are single-peaked. Here we
abandon the anonymity requirement and allow arbitrary preferences. Thus, the order on the
set of outcomes becomes an element of the decision making procedure, unrelated to the players’
preferences.
An ordered voting game form is defined by the following construction. A is linearly ordered
and Xi = A for each i ∈ N . Strictly speaking, our assumption Xi ∩ Xj = ∅ is thus violated,
but it does not matter here. For each i ∈ N , a “weight” µi ≥ 0 is given; for each a ∈ A, a
number λa > 0. We assume that λa decreases in a. Given xN ∈ XN and a ∈ A, we denote
N−(a, xN) = {i ∈ N | xi < a}, κ−(a, xN) =
∑
i∈N−(a,xN ) µi, and define
g(xN) = max{a ∈ A | κ−(a, xN) < λa}.
The interpretation is that each player chooses a “personal cap” xi supported by her weight µi;
λa is the minimal total weight against a that makes it ineligible.
If all µi = 1 and λa = 1, we have a unanimity game form, the FIP of which was established
by Proposition 3.4; if all µi = 1 and λa = n, we have g(xN) = maxi∈N xi, i.e., Proposition 3.4 is
still applicable after the order on A is reversed. Generally, there is no FIP.
Example 3.5. Let us consider an ordered voting game form G with N = {1, 2}, A = {a, b, c}
(a > b > c), both µi = 1, λc = λb = 2, and λa = 1 (median voting scheme with a fixed vote at
b). The game form is described by the following matrix:
a b b
b b b
b b c
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The underlined outcomes form an improvement cycle in G(υN) with appropriate utilities; there-
fore, G does not have the FIP (although it is Nash consistent).
Somewhat unnatural behavior may be observed in the cycle: in the “clockwise” movement,
player 2 switches from a to b by choosing c, and from c to b by choosing a.
Given a, b ∈ A, we define the order distance between them as
d(a, b) = #{x ∈ A | min{a, b} ≤ x < max{a, b}}; (3.4)
then we define an admissible change relation by (2.10) with d as δx−i for every i ∈ N and
x−i ∈ X−i. In other words, a change of strategy is admissible if the same change of outcome
could not be produced by a shorter movement of xi.
Theorem 3.6. Every ordered voting game form has an almost unrestricted FIP with the qua-
sidistance on each Xi defined by (3.4) [independently of x−i].
Proof. We denote M = {µi}i∈N ⊂ R and N(m) = {i ∈ N | µi ≥ m} for each m ∈ M .
Given xN ∈ XN and m ∈ M , we define γ−m(xN) = max{a ∈ A | κ−(a, xN) + m < λa} and
γ+m(xN) = max{a ∈ A | κ−(a, xN) − m < λa}; clearly, γ−m(xN) ≤ g(xN) ≤ γ+m(xN). Then we
define Cm(xN) = {a ∈ A | γ−m(xN) ≤ a ≤ γ+m(xN)}, Bm(xN) = {i ∈ N(m) | xi ∈ Cm(xN)}, and
Pm(xN) =
∑
i∈Bm(xN ) υi(xi)}. A binary relation on XN is defined as a lexicography:
yN ºm xN ­
[
Cm(yN) ⊂ Cm(xN) or
[
Cm(yN) = Cm(xN) &(
Bm(yN) ⊃ Bm(xN) or [Bm(yN) = Bm(xN) & Pm(yN) ≥ Pm(xN)]
)] ]
;
yN Âm xN ­
[
Cm(yN) ⊂ Cm(xN) or
[
Cm(yN) = Cm(xN) &(
Bm(yN) ⊃ Bm(xN) or [Bm(yN) = Bm(xN) & Pm(yN) > Pm(xN)]
)] ]
.
Clearly,
yN Âm xN ⇐⇒
[
yN ºm xN & xN 6ºm yN
]
.
Finally, a lexicographic aggregate is formed of ºm (m ∈M):
yN Â xN ­ ∃m ∈M
[
yN Âm xN & ∀m′ > m [yN ºm′ xN ]
]
.
Obviously, Â is a strict order; we’ll show that it is a potential, in the sense of (2.5b), for
admissible improvements. Let i ∈ N and xN , yN ∈ XN be such that y−i = x−i; we denote
a = g(xN) and b = g(yN) and assume b 6= a. For every c ∈ A, we denote c+ 1 the next point in
A, uniquely defined by c+ 1 > c and d(c, c+ 1) = 1.
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Step 3.6.1. b ∈ Cµi(xN).
Proof. Since κ−(b, yN) < λb while κ−(b, yN) ≥ κ−(b, xN) − µi, we have κ−(b, xN) < λb + µi,
hence b ≥ γ−µi(xN). For each c > γ+µi(xN), we have κ−(c, yN) ≥ κ−(c, xN)−µi ≥ λc, hence c 6= b;
therefore, b ≤ γ+µi(xN).
Step 3.6.2. xN `i yN ⇐⇒ yi = b.
Proof. If xi < a, then κ−(a, yN) ≤ κ−(a, xN) < λa, hence b > a. If xi > a, then κ−(a+1, yN) ≥
κ−(a+ 1, xN) ≥ λa+1, hence b < a.
Let b > a; then xi ≤ a. If yi < b, then κ−(b, yN) = κ−(b, xN) ≥ λb: a contradiction.
Obviously minyi≥bi d(xi, yi) is attained when yi = b.
Let b < a; then xi ≥ a. If yi > b, then κ−(b+1, yN) = κ−(b+1, xN) < λb+1: a contradiction.
Obviously minyi≤bi d(xi, yi) is attained when yi = b.
In the following, we assume yi = b.
Step 3.6.3. Cm(yN) ⊆ Cm(xN) for each m ≥ µi.
Proof. Let b > a; then κ−(c, yN) ≤ κ−(c, xN) for each c ≤ b, while κ−(c, yN) = κ−(c, xN) for
each c > b. Since γ−m(xN) ≤ a < b ≤ γ+m(xN), we have γ−m(yN) ≥ γ−m(xN) and γ+m(yN) = γ+m(xN).
The case of b < a is treated dually.
Step 3.6.4. yN ºm xN for each m > µi.
Proof. Indeed, Cm(yN) ⊆ Cm(xN) by Step 3.6.3. If the inclusion is strict, we even have yN Âm
xN . Otherwise, Bm(yN) = Bm(xN) and Pm(yN) = Pm(xN) since yN(m) = xN(m).
Step 3.6.5. If υi(b) > υi(a), then yN Âµi xN .
Proof. Again, Cµi(yN) ⊆ Cµi(xN) by Step 3.6.3. Since i ∈ Bµi(yN), we only have to consider
the case of Cµi(yN) = Cµi(xN) and Bµi(yN) = Bµi(xN), i.e., i ∈ Bµi(xN). If xi = a, we
have Pµi(yN) − Pµi(xN) = υi(b) − υi(a) > 0. Suppose xi < a; then γ−m(xN) ≤ xi < a and
b = yi > a. On the other hand, κ−(a, yN) ≥ κ−(a, xN)− µi, hence κ−(a, yN) + µi < λa, hence
γ−µi(yN) ≥ a > γ−µi(xN), hence Cµi(yN) ⊂ Cµi(xN), contradicting our assumption. The case of
xi > a is treated dually.
In the light of Steps 3.6.4 and 3.6.5, the proof of the theorem is accomplished.
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Theorem 3.6 becomes wrong if strategy sets Xi ⊂ A are allowed: the assumption X2 = {a, c}
in Example 3.5 would make the changes made by player 2 along the cycle unique.
Remark. In the absence of fixed votes, i.e., when λa is the same for all a ∈ A, an ordered
voting game form is obviously separable: p(xi) = xi. The statement seems to be wrong generally
although I have not studied the question carefully.
3.2 Games with perfect information
The most important examples of game forms with FIP or almost unrestricted FIP are pro-
vided by the normal form of games with perfect information. Following Kukushkin (2002a), we
reproduce the familiar concepts in a fashion most convenient for our purposes.
A perfect information game form (PIGF ) is a game form with arbitrary (finite) sets N and
A, and strategies and the mapping g generated by a construction as follows. A game tree K
is a finite partially ordered set satisfying these two conditions. (a) For every α ∈ K, the set
{β ∈ K | β ≤ α} is a chain. (b) There exists the minimum α0 of K (the origin), α0 ≤ α for
every α ∈ K. The existence of the meet (greatest common lower bound) α∧β for every α, β ∈ K
easily follows. We call β ∈ K an immediate successor of α ∈ K if α < β while α < β′ < β is
impossible; the set of all immediate successors of α ∈ K is denoted Xα. Imagining an arc from
every α ∈ K to every β ∈ Xα turns K into a tree in a geometrical sense.
The set of maximizers of the order on K is denoted T (terminal nodes); the set K \ T , D
(decision nodes). There is an ownership mapping ν : D → N ; player i moves at nodes from
Di = ν
−1(i). We denote Xi =
∏
α∈Di Xα for i ∈ N and XN =
∏
i∈N Xi. We identify XN with∏
α∈DXα. For every xN ∈ XN and α ∈ D, we denote pi(α, xN) ⊆ K the intersection of all
subsets K ′ of K satisfying these two conditions: α ∈ K ′ and [β ∈ K ′ ⇒ xβ ∈ K ′]; note that
pi(α, xN) is a chain: a play of the game starting at α. The unique element of T ∩ pi(α, xN) is
denoted τ(α, xN): the result of playing xN starting at α.
Finally, there is a mapping γ : T → A and g(xN) = γ(τ(α0, xN)). If γ is a bijection, G is
called free; in this case, we may just assume A = T (as was done in Kukushkin, 2002a). For
each α ∈ D, we denote F (α) = γ({β ∈ T | β > α}), the set of outcomes feasible if the play
passes through α.
To avoid pathologies, we always assume that #Xα > 1 and #F (α) > 1 for every α ∈ D
(i.e., there is no “meaningless” decision node), while Xα ∩Di = ∅ for all i ∈ N and α ∈ Di (i.e.,
no player can make two consecutive choices). The restrictions are innocuous and allow more
compact formulations of Theorem 3.8, Hypothesis 3.10, and Proposition 3.19 below.
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Proposition 3.7. A game form is simple if and only if it can be represented as a perfect
information game form where D is a chain in the tree order, i.e., there exists a play of the game
containing all decision nodes.
Proof. Straightforward.
Theorem 3.8 (Theorem 1 of Kukushkin, 2002a). If G is a free perfect information game
form, then G has the FIP if and only if each Di is a chain in the tree order, i.e., for each player
there exists a play of the game containing all his decision nodes.
The sufficiency part, naturally, holds for every PIGF, which cannot be said about the neces-
sity.
Example 3.9. Let us consider a three-person perfect information game form with five decision
nodes, six terminal nodes, and five outcomes. We assume D1 = {α0, α2, α3}, D2 = {β2},
D3 = {β3} and A = {a, b, c, d, e}; γ is described by putting outcomes at terminal nodes.
a
1←−−− α2 2←−−− β2 1←−−− α0 1−−−→ β3 3−−−→ α3 1−−−→ e
1
y 2y y3 y1
b c c d
The FIP is not difficult to check.
To extend Theorem 3.8 to the general case, we introduce the following requirements. First,
the decision nodes of each player form a subsemilattice of the game tree, i.e., if a player moves
at two incomparable nodes, he must move at their meet too:
α, α′ ∈ Di ⇒ α ∧ α′ ∈ Di. (3.5a)
The second condition needs some auxiliary notations. For i ∈ N and α, β ∈ Di, we denote:
F ∗(α, β) = γ({t ∈ T | α < t ∧ β < β & t ∧ β /∈ Di});
F ∗∗(α, β) =
F ∗(α, β), if #F (β) > 2;F ∗(α, β) \ F (β), if #F (β) = 2.
Now the condition is
∀i ∈ N ∀α ∈ Di ∀β′, β′′ ∈ Di \ {α} [β′ ∧ β′′ = α & c′ ∈ F ∗∗(α, β′) & c′′ ∈ F ∗∗(α, β′′)⇒ c′ = c′′].
(3.5b)
If Di is a chain, then (3.5a) holds trivially while (3.5b) holds by default. Generally, conditions
(3.5) mean that each Di contains a subchain D
∗
i such that if player i makes the play to turn
towards a decision node from Di\D∗i then all other players have a rather little say in determining
the outcome.
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Hypothesis 3.10. A perfect information game form has the FIP if and only if it satisfies
assumptions (3.5).
The necessity part is easily derived from the proof of Theorem 1 in Kukushkin (2002a).
Proposition 3.11. Every perfect information game form satisfying assumptions (3.5) is sepa-
rable.
Proof. Given i ∈ N and xi ∈ Xi, we define α(xi) as the greatest in the tree order (i.e., the
furthest from the origin) decision node of player i that can be reached when player i chooses xi.
It is well defined because of (3.5a). Now if xi prescribes to player i to choose a terminal node t
at α(xi), i.e., if xα(xi) = t ∈ T , we define p(xi) = γ(t); otherwise, p(xi) ∈ A is arbitrary.
Checking (3.1) is easy. Let τ(α0, xN) = t, hence g(xN) = γ(t). We denote i the player who
made the last move in the play ending at t, and β the decision node where that last move was
made. Obviously, β = α(xi) and γ(t) = p(xi).
By Proposition 3.7, every two-person perfect information game form satisfying assumptions
(3.5) is simple. The converse to Proposition 3.11 is wrong: the proof only needs (3.5a). On the
other hand, Proposition 3.11 becomes wrong if assumptions (3.5) are dropped altogether.
Example 3.12. Let us consider a free two-person perfect information game form with three
decision nodes; we assume D1 = {α0} and D2 = {β′, β′′}.
a
2←−−− β′ 1←−−− α0 1−−−→ β′′ 2−−−→ d
2
y y2
b c
If it were a separable game form, we could, without restricting generality, assume p(β′) = a and
p(β′′) = d. Now if p(b, c) 6= b, then (3.1) is violated for xN = 〈β′, (b, c)〉; if p(b, c) 6= c, then (3.1)
is violated for xN = 〈β′′, (b, c)〉.
Given a perfect information game form, we define the distance between two strategies of the
same player i ∈ N as
d(xi, yi) = #{α ∈ Di | yα 6= xα}. (3.6)
Then we define admissible change relations for each i ∈ N by (2.10) with the quasidistances
δx−i(xi, yi) = d(xi, yi) for every x−i ∈ X−i. In other words, a change of the strategy of a player
is admissible if the number of nodes involved is minimal, i.e., there was no change at irrelevant
nodes.
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Theorem 3.13 (Theorem 3 of Kukushkin, 2002a). Every perfect information game form
has an almost unrestricted FIP with admissible change relations defined by the “costs” (3.6).
Remark. A modification of the proof from Kukushkin (2002a) allows us to derive a corollary
(Proposition 3.18 in the next subsection), which may be of some interest.
Proof. Let xN ∈ XN and t ∈ T ; we say that t is blocked by player i at xN if there exist α ∈ Di
and β ∈ Xα such that t ∈ pi(β, xN) \ pi(α, xN) (it follows immediately that τ(β, xN) = t and
xα 6= β). Let t 6= τ(α0, xN); then the set {α < t | t /∈ pi(α, xN)} is a nonempty chain, so we
may pick its maximum α and denote i = ν(α). Obviously, t is blocked by i at xN and t cannot
be blocked at xN by any other player. We thus obtain a partitioning of T \ {τ(α0, xN)} into
subsets Bi(xN) of terminal nodes blocked by each particular player i ∈ N at xN .
It is important to note that #Bi(xN) does not depend on xN ; actually, #Bi(xN) =
[
∑
α∈Di #Xα] − #Di because choosing any alternative from Xα for α ∈ Di, player i does not
choose each of #Xα − 1 others thereby blocking the same number of terminal nodes (exactly
which terminal nodes are blocked depends on the choices at successive nodes).
Defining P (xN) = −
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈Bi(xN ) υi ◦ γ(t)}, let us show that P is a numeric potential of
B>. Assuming yN B>i xN , we have to prove that P (yN) > P (xN).
We denote t = τ(α0, xN) and t
′ = τ(α0, yN); then υi ◦ γ(t′) > υi ◦ γ(t) and t ∧ t′ ∈ Di. Let
us show first Bj(xN) ⊆ Bj(yN) for each j 6= i. Assuming t′′ ∈ Bj(xN), we, by the definition of
blocking, have α ∈ Dj and β ∈ Xα such that t′′ ∈ pi(β, xN) \ pi(α, xN). Since j 6= i, yα = xα,
hence t′′ /∈ pi(α, yN) and t′′ 6= t′; moreover, t′′ ∧ t′ ≤ α. Now t′′ 6= τ(β, yN) could only be possible
if there were β′ ∈ pi(β, xN) such that yβ′ 6= xβ′ , hence β′ ∈ Di; but then the replacement of
xβ′ with yβ′ would be a superfluous change incompatible with the minimization of “costs” (3.6).
More formally, considering zi which coincides with xi at β
′ and with yi at all other nodes from
Di, we immediately see that g(zi, x−i) = g(yi, x−i) = g(yN) while δx−i(xi, zi) < δx−i(xi, yi).
Therefore, τ(β, yN) = t
′′, hence t′′ ∈ Bj(yN).
Now Bj(xN) ⊆ Bj(yN) implies Bj(xN) = Bj(yN) for all j 6= i. It follows immediately that
Bi(yN) = (Bi(xN) \ {t′}) ∪ {t}, hence
P (yN)− P (xN) = υi ◦ γ(t′)− υi ◦ γ(t) = ui(yN)− ui(xN). (3.7)
Thus, we have P (yN) > P (xN).
An extension of the notion of a PIGF is met in the literature quite often, see, e.g., Boros
and Gurvich (2003) and references therein. Suppose there is a directed graph, its nonterminal
nodes are partitioned among the players, and one of them is fixed as the origin. Each player
is free to choose an arc leading from each of her decision nodes (“stationary strategies”); once
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all strategies are chosen, a play of the game is uniquely defined: after a finite number of steps,
either a terminal node is reached, or a cycle starts repeating itself ad infinitum. Treating cycles
as additional outcomes, we obtain a game form.
If the players were allowed to condition their choices on history, we would return to a game
on a (finite or infinite) tree. The stationarity requirement is effectively equivalent to imperfect
information: when making a decision at a node, the player does not know how the play has
come there. It is well known that a game with imperfect information, even on a finite tree,
need not possess a Nash equilibrium (unless mixed strategies are invoked). In this class of
games, however, the lack of information only concerns the past, which does not affect future
possibilities. Therefore, it seems natural to expect no big difference with the standard perfect
information model.
Indeed, if the graph is acyclic, i.e., the underlying tree is finite, an equilibrium can be obtained
by the standard backward recursion. If cycles are possible, the underlying tree becomes infinite,
and there is nowhere to derive an equilibrium from. An intermediate case emerges when the
graph contains cycles, but every cycle is worse for each player than any terminal node (Boros
and Gurvich, 2003); then no infinite play can result from any improvement.
Here we briefly consider the possibility to extend Theorem 3.13 to a game on an acyclic
graph. The result, Theorem 3.14 below, is distinctly weaker; to be more precise, a restricted
FIP is established, but an almost unrestricted FIP is not (so far).
The definition of a positional acyclic game form is most conveniently given in the same style
as in the beginning of this subsection. Instead of a game tree, we consider a finite partially
ordered set K satisfying condition (b) from the definition of a PIGF: the existence of the origin
α0. The partition of K into decision nodes D and terminal nodes T is the same; the ownership
mapping ν : D → N is the same; the definitions of immediate successors Xα of α ∈ K, as well
as strategies Xi =
∏
α∈Di Xα and strategy profiles XN =
∏
i∈N Xi =
∏
α∈DXα are the same.
Since condition (a) from the definition of a PIGF is dropped, we may always assume that γ is
a bijection, i.e., T = A. A play of the game starting at α, pi(α, xN) ⊆ K, is defined in the same
way, and still is a chain; the result of playing xN starting at α, τ(α, xN), is still uniquely defined.
Finally, the assumption Xα ∩Di = ∅ for all i ∈ N and α ∈ Di no longer looks innocuous and is
not made.
We start with the definition of a strengthened version of restricted FIP. Given a family of
“costs” δx−i on each Xi, we define the cost-efficient individual improvement relation on XN by
yN B>i xN ­
[
yN BIndi xN &
@zi ∈ Xi [δx−i(xi, zi) < δx−i(xi, yi) & ui(zi, x−i) ≥ ui(yN)]
]
(3.8a)
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and
yN B> xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN B>i xN ]. (3.8b)
A game form has an FCIP if there are “costs” δx−i on each Xi such that the cost-efficient
individual improvement relation (3.8) is acyclic in every derivative game.
Theorem 3.14. Every positional acyclic game form has an FCIP with the “costs” (3.6).
Proof. Given xN ∈ XN and α ∈ D, we define vα(xN) = υν(α)(τ(α, xN)): what the player who
moves at α would get if the play passes through the node. Then we define a lexicographic order
on XN :
yN Â xN ­
[∃α ∈ K [vα(yN) > vα(xN)] &
∀α ∈ K (vα(yN) < vα(xN)⇒ ∃β ∈ K [β > α & vβ(yN) > vβ(xN)])]. (3.9)
Clearly, Â is a strict order.
Supposing that xN , yN ∈ XN and yN B>i xN , we show that yN Â xN . We denote B = {β ∈
K | yβ 6= xβ} 6= ∅. Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.13, we have B ⊆ Di ∩ pi(α0, yN), hence
there exists β∗ = maxB.
Let us show that vβ∗(yN) > vβ∗(xN). Supposing the contrary, we define zN ∈ XN by
zβ∗ = xβ∗ and zα = yα for all α 6= β∗. Clearly, ui(zN) = vβ∗(zN) = vβ∗(xN) ≥ vβ∗(yN) = ui(yN).
Since d(xi, zi) < d(xi, yi), we have a contradiction with the assumption yN B>i xN .
Finally, let α ∈ K and vα(yN) 6= vα(xN), hence B ∩ pi(α, yN) 6= ∅. Picking β ∈ B ∩ pi(α, yN),
we have β∗ ≥ β ≥ α. Since vβ∗(yN) > vβ∗(xN), (3.9) holds.
It is impossible to derive an almost unrestricted FIP from the above argument: the inequality
vβ∗(yN) > vβ∗(xN) need not hold without the “cost-efficiency” of the improvement. Whether
the conditions of Theorem 3.14 imply the property itself remains an open question.
Proposition 3.15. A positional acyclic game form has an almost unrestricted FIP with admis-
sible change relations defined by the “costs” (3.6) if each Di is an anti-chain, i.e., all β, β
′ ∈ Di
are incomparable in the order on K.
Proof. Let yN B>i xN . In the notation from the proof of Theorem 3.14, we have B = {β∗},
hence vβ∗(yN) = ui(yN) > ui(xN) = vβ∗(xN), hence yN Â xN .
It is funny to contrast Proposition 3.15 with Theorem 3.8.
Proposition 3.16. A positional acyclic game form has the FIP if each Di is a singleton.
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Proof. Retaining the notation from the proof of Theorem 3.14 and arguing in the same way, it
is easy to show that yN Â xN whenever yN BInd xN .
The converse to Proposition 3.16 is wrong. There is no plausible hypothesis about necessary
and sufficient conditions for FIP in this class of game forms.
3.3 Cardinal utilities and potentials
Although our main subject are games with ordinal preferences and we do not consider mixed
extensions, it seems impossible not to say a few words about cardinal utilities. Actually, Mon-
derer and Shapley (1996) paid most attention to that case. Moreover, they assumed that the
utilities of all players are measured in the same scale; we make the same assumption here.
Let Γ be a game with such “co-cardinal” utilities. Monderer and Shapley (1996) defined an
exact potential of Γ as a function P : XN → R such that
ui(yN)− ui(xN) = P (yN)− P (xN) (3.10)
whenever i ∈ N , yN , xN ∈ XN , and y−i = x−i. An ordinal potential of Γ is a function P : XN →
R such that
sign(ui(yN)− ui(xN)) = sign(P (yN)− P (xN)) (3.11)
whenever i ∈ N , yN , xN ∈ XN , and y−i = x−i. The latter notion is indeed ordinal, i.e., invariant
under strictly increasing transformations of utilities. Voorneveld and Norde (1996) showed that
the existence of an ordinal potential is equivalent to the absence of “weak improvement cycles.”
Obviously, (3.10) implies (3.11), of which it is the most natural cardinal analogue.
Theorem 3.17. For every game form G, the following statements are equivalent.
1. Every derivative game G(υN) admits an exact potential.
2. Every derivative game G(υN) admits an ordinal potential.
3. G is dictatorial.
Proof. The implications [Statement 3 ⇒ Statement 1 ⇒ Statement 2] are straightforward. Let
Statement 2 hold.
Step 3.17.1. If i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, xN , yN , zN ∈ XN , x−i = y−i, y−j = z−j, and g(xN) 6= g(yN),
then g(yN) = g(zN).
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Proof. Supposing the contrary, we denote y′N = (zj, x−j). Then we pick a constant as υj, and
define υi(g(xN)) = 1 and υi(g(yN)) = 0. If g(y
′
N) = g(zN), we obtain a weak improvement
cycle in G(υN): υi(g(xN)) > υi(g(yN)), υj(g(yN)) = υj(g(zN)), υi(g(zN)) = υi(g(y
′
N)), and
υj(g(y
′
N)) = υj(g(xN)); clearly, this is incompatible with (3.11). Otherwise, if g(xN) = g(zN),
we set υi(g(y
′
N)) = 0 and again obtain the same cycle: υi(g(xN)) > υi(g(yN)), υj(g(yN)) =
υj(g(zN)), υi(g(zN)) > υi(g(y
′
N)), and υj(g(y
′
N)) = υj(g(xN)). Finally, if g(xN) 6= g(zN) 6=
g(y′N), we set υi(g(y
′
N)) = υi(g(zN)) [a numeric value cannot be specified because both g(y
′
N) =
g(xN) and g(y
′
N) = g(yN) are possible] and again obtain the same cycle.
Step 3.17.2. If i ∈ N , xN , yN ∈ XN , x−i = y−i, and g(xN) 6= g(yN), then player i is a dictator.
Proof. Given j ∈ N \ {i}, Step 3.17.1 immediately implies that g(yi, zj, x−ij) = g(yN) and
g(xi, zj, x−ij) = g(xN) for all zj ∈ Xj. For every zN ∈ XN such that z−i = x−i = y−i, we
have either g(zN) 6= g(xN) or g(zN) 6= g(yN), hence the previous argument applies and player j
cannot change the outcome. Therefore, if x′−j = x−j and y
′
−j = y−j, then the assumptions of the
lemma hold for x′N and y
′
N as well, hence no player k can change the outcome deviating from
xk at x
′
−k. Iterating the reasoning, we see that player i is a dictator.
If #g(XN) = 1, then every player is a dictator. If g(xN) 6= g(yN), then there is a strategic
path x0N , x
1
N , . . . , x
n
N such that x
0
N = xN and x
n
N = yN . Clearly, we must have g(x
k
N) 6= g(xk+1N )
for some k, hence Step 3.17.2 applies.
We call G a nearly potential game form if there is a liberal admissible change relation `i
on XN for each i ∈ N , and a function P : XN → R for every derivative game G(υN) such that
(3.10) holds whenever i ∈ N , yN , xN ∈ XN , xN `i yN , and g(yN) 6= g(xN). We call G an almost
potential game form if there is a function P : XN → R for every derivative game G(υN) such
that (3.10) holds whenever i ∈ N , yN , xN ∈ XN , x−i = y−i, and g(yN) 6= g(xN). Clearly, every
almost potential game form has the FIP while every nearly potential game form has an almost
unrestricted FIP.
Proposition 3.18. Every perfect information game form is a nearly potential one. If ν is
injective, i.e., each player has at most one decision node, then it is an almost potential game
form.
Proof. Defining the admissible change relations by the “costs” (3.6) and potential P as in the
proof of Theorem 3.13, we refer to (3.7). If each Di is a singleton, then every change of strategy
producing a change of outcome is admissible.
Proposition 3.19. If a free perfect information game form is an almost potential one, then ν
is injective.
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Proof. The necessity of (3.5a) for the FIP is easy to see regardless of Hypothesis 3.10, so if ν
is not injective, we may assume that ν(α) = ν(α′) = i while α < α′. By the non-degeneracy
assumptions, there must be β ∈ Dj such that α < β < α′ and j 6= i. Since G is free, there must
be a fragment of the type
a b b
a c d
where player i chooses columns and player j rows, and different letters denote different out-
comes. Individual changes of strategies starting at the northwestern corner produce this cycle
of outcomes: a → b → c → d → b → a. Therefore, (3.10) would imply that υi(b) − υi(a) +
υj(c)−υj(b)+υi(d)−υi(c)+υj(b)−υj(d)+υi(a)−υi(b) = 0, hence υi(d)−υi(c) = υj(d)−υj(c).
Clearly, the equality does not hold for all utility functions.
The assumption that the game form is free cannot be dropped. Example 4.8 below disproves
putative hypotheses like “every nearly (or almost) potential game form can be represented as
a perfect information game form”; on the other hand, such examples seem rare, so a plausible
hypothesis may be obtainable.
4 FCP Game Forms
4.1 Characterization
Given I ∈ N \ {N}, a superfragment of G is a game form with two players, “I” and “−I,”
nonempty subsets of XI and X−I as strategy sets, respectively, and the appropriate restriction
of g. The FCP(+) of G obviously implies the same property of every superfragment; no such
assertion holds for the FIP.
Following Boros et al. (2008a), we call a game form G totally tight if every 2×2 superfragment
of G contains a simple strategy; in other words, if the condition
{g(x′I , x′−I), g(x′′I , x′′−I)} ∩ {g(x′I , x′′−I), g(x′′I , x′−I)} 6= ∅ (4.1)
holds for each I ∈ N , x′I , x′′I ∈ XI and x′−I , x′′−I ∈ X−I .
Proposition 4.1. Let G be a game form such that g(XN) = {q, a}. Then G is totally tight if
and only if there is an ordering ºI on XI for every I ∈ N such that
∀I ∈ N ∀xN , x′N ∈ XN [g(x′N) = q & x′I ºI xI & x′−I = x−I ]⇒ g(xN) = q. (4.2)
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An interpretation should be clear: all strategies of a player or a coalition are (weakly) ordered
according to how much effort is spent in trying to switch from a status quo ante outcome q to
the unique available alternative; whenever the effort proves insufficient, less effort cannot be
sufficient. The term “a binary lobbing game form” may be appropriate.
Proof. Necessity. Let (4.1) hold everywhere. For each I ∈ N , we define a binary relation on
XI :
yI ºI xI ­ ∀x−I ∈ X−I [g(yI , x−I) = q ⇒ g(xI , x−I) = q]; (4.3)
the relation is obviously a preorder. Incomparability of yI and xI would immediately imply a
violation of (4.1); therefore, ºI is an ordering for every I ∈ N . The “monotonicity” requirement
(4.2) immediately follows from (4.3).
Sufficiency. Suppose that (4.2) holds, but (4.1) is violated by a superfragment. Without
restricting generality, x′′I ºI x′I and x′′−I º−I x′−I ; therefore, g(x′I , x′−I) = q. The supposed
negation of (4.1) implies that g(x′′I , x
′
−I) = g(x
′
I , x
′′
−I) = a, but then g(x
′′
I , x
′′
−I) = a by (4.2).
Theorem 4.2. A game form G has the FCP if and only if G is either dictatorial, or totally
tight with #g(XN) ≤ 2.
Remark. So far, there is no explanation for the obvious similarity with Arrow’s impossibility
theorem.
Proof. Sufficiency. A dictatorial game form poses no problem. Let G be totally tight with
g(XN) = {a, q} and x0N , x1N , . . . , xmN = x0N be a coalition improvement cycle in a derivative
game G(υN). Without restricting generality, g(x
0
N) = a, hence g(x
2k
N ) = a, g(x
2k+1
N ) = q,
and m is even. We denote I = {i ∈ N | υi(a) > υi(q)}, J = {i ∈ N | υi(q) > υi(a)},
and N0 = {i ∈ N | υi(a) = υi(q)}. Each player i ∈ N0 chooses the same strategy at each
xkN ; without restricting generality, we may assume N = I ∪ J . Obviously, x2k+1I = x2kI and
x2k+2J = x
2k+1
J for all k. By Proposition 4.1, we have x
2k+2
I ÂI x2k+1I = x2kI for each k, which
contradicts the assumption xmN = x
0
N .
Necessity. Let G have the FCP. We start with an auxiliary statement.
Step 4.2.1. #g(X ′N) ≤ 2 for every 2× 2 superfragment of G.
Proof. Suppose the contrary: there is a superfragment of G of the type a bd c with a 6= b 6= c 6= a.
Let I choose rows and −I columns. We consider a utility vector υN such that υi(a) > υi(c) >
υi(b) for each i ∈ I and υi(b) > υi(a) > υi(c) for each i /∈ I. A coalition improvement cycle in
G(υN) is obvious: a→ b→ c→ a.
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Suppose that G is not dictatorial. Then for each i ∈ N there is xi ∈ Xi such that
#g(xi, X−i) ≥ 2. Moreover, at least two players are not “dummies,” i.e., there is x−i ∈ X−i
such that #g(Xi, x−i) ≥ 2. Whenever i ∈ N , xi, x′i ∈ Xi, x−i, x′−i ∈ X−i and g(x′i, x−i) 6=
g(xi, x−i) 6= g(xi, x′−i), there holds g(x′i, x−i) = g(xi, x′−i) by Step 4.2.1. It follows immediately
that #g(xi, X−i) ≤ 2 for every non-dummy i ∈ N and xi ∈ Xi.
If #g(XN) > 2, there must exist i ∈ N , xi, x′i ∈ Xi and a, b, c, d ∈ A such that a 6= b 6= c 6= a,
b 6= d 6= c, g(xi, X−i) = {a, b}, and g(x′i, X−i) = {c, d}. We pick x−i ∈ X−i such that g(xi, x−i) =
b. If g(x′i, x−i) = a, we pick x
′
−i ∈ X−i such that g(x′i, x′−i) = c and obtain a contradiction with
Step 4.2.1. If g(x′i, x−i) = c, we pick x
′
−i ∈ X−i such that g(x′i, x′−i) = a and again obtain a
contradiction with Step 4.2.1.
Thus, either G is dictatorial or #g(XN) = 2. In the latter case, the necessity of (4.1) is
shown exactly as in Moulin (1976).
Proposition 4.3. Every FCP game form is separable.
Proof. If G is dictatorial, there is nothing to prove. If A = {q, a}, we define p(xi) = q for all
strategies of one player, p(xj) = a for another, and arbitrarily for all others.
Theorem 4.4. A game form G has the FCP+ if and only if it has the FCP and either #g(XN) =
1 or #N ≤ 2.
Proof. Sufficiency. Let #N = 2. Given a utility vector υN , we take υ
∗
N with the property
υ∗i (a) > υ
∗
i (b) ⇐⇒
[
υi(a) > υi(b) or [υi(a) = υi(b) & υ−i(a) > υ−i(b)]
]
for each i ∈ N and a, b ∈ A. Clearly, a weak coalition improvement path in G(υN) is a coalition
improvement path in G(υ∗N), hence G has the FCP
+ as well as the FCP.
Necessity. Let #g(XN) > 1; then there are i ∈ N xi, x′i ∈ Xi, and x−i ∈ X−i such
that a = g(xi, x−i) 6= g(x′i, x−i) = b. Supposing #N > 2, we can pick j, k ∈ N such that
j 6= i 6= k 6= j. Whenever υi(a) = υi(b), υj(a) > υj(b), and υk(a) < υk(b), we have a weak
coalition improvement cycle where player i switches between xi and x
′
i back and forth, while the
other players choose x−i.
4.2 Voting by veto
The title of this subsection refers to a class of voting procedures; each of them defines a game
form. There are finite sets of players N and of outcomes, or alternatives, A. The players may
have arbitrary preferences over the outcomes. A voting by veto procedure specifies positive
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integer numbers λa and µi for each a ∈ A and i ∈ N : µi is the number of black balls given
to player i; λa is the “veto-resistance” of outcome a. Each player allocates his/her black balls
among the outcomes; if the number of balls allocated to a ∈ A equals or exceeds λa, the outcome
is vetoed. To ensure the existence of non-vetoed outcomes, we impose the restriction∑
a∈A
λa ≥
∑
i∈N
µi + 1. (4.4)
A linear order is assumed on A; if several outcomes are not vetoed, the highest of them is
selected.
To describe strategies formally, we assume there is a finite set D of black balls with an
ownership mapping ν : D → N . Balls from Di = ν−1(i) are given to player i; we assume
#Di = µi. A strategy of player i is a mapping xi : Di → A; a strategy profile can be understood
as a mapping xN : D → A. For each I ∈ N , we denote DI =
⋃
i∈I Di; every strategy of the
coalition can be understood as a mapping xI : DI → A. Given a ∈ A, I ∈ N , and xI ∈ XI , we
denote κ(a, xI) = #x−1I (a), the number of balls cast to a by I under xI . An outcome a is vetoed
at a strategy profile xN if κ(a, xN) ≥ λa and over-vetoed if the inequality is strict. g(xN) is the
highest non-vetoed outcome.
For brevity, a game form generated by a voting by veto procedure is called a VV game
form. Every ordered voting game form from Subsection 3.1 with integer µ’s and λ’s can be
represented as the fragment of a VV game form: each player i can choose a ∈ A \ {minA}
and put µi black balls against a and each outcome above a. Since N and A are finite, it seems
plausible that integer µ’s and λ’s are sufficient to generate all ordered voting game forms. Non-
integer µ’s and λ’s, apparently, would generate a broader class of VV game forms; however, such
voting procedures may seem too exotic, and are outside the realm of finite game forms anyway.
Generally, fragments of VV game forms do not possess any nice property: the underlined 2× 2
fragment in Example 4.6 is not even Nash consistent.
Remark. If there is b ∈ A such that ∑a>b λa ≥∑i∈N µi + 1, then b /∈ g(XN). In a sense, the
elimination of such outcomes would not change the game form; however, their presence creates
no difficulties either.
Proposition 4.5. Every VV game form G with #g(XN) ≤ 2 has the FCP.
Proof. Without restricting generality, we assume g(XN) = {q, a} with q > a; then λq + λa >∑
i∈N µi. For each I ∈ N and xI , x′I ∈ XI , we define x′I ºI xI ­ κ(q, x′I) ≥ κ(q, xI). It is clear
now that G satisfies (4.2), hence the sufficiency part of Theorem 4.2 applies.
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Example 4.6. Let A = {a, b, c}, a > b > c, N = {1, 2}, and every µ and λ be equal to 1. The
game form is described by the following matrix:
b c b
c a a
b a a
Assuming υ1(a) = υ1(b) = 1, υ1(c) = 0, υ2(a) = υ2(b) = 0, υ2(c) = 1, we see that the
underlined outcomes form an improvement cycle in G(υN); therefore, G does not have even the
FIP (although it is strongly consistent).
Example 4.6 carries a subtler message as well. We might distinguish between “outcomes”
from A and “voting proposals”: since υi(a) = υi(b) for both i in the example, we may assume
that a and b are just different proposals implying the same outcome, hence #A = 2. Therefore,
Proposition 4.5 would not survive this generalization of the notion of voting by veto.
Theorem 4.7. Let G be a game form with N = {1, 2} and A = {q, a}. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. G has the FCP.
2. G is simple.
3. G can be represented as the fragment of a VV game form.
Proof. Suppose Statement 1 holds, hence Theorem 4.2 applies. If G is dictatorial, then both
Statements 2 and 3 are obvious. Otherwise, we define an ordering ºi on each Xi by (4.3). We
pick x−i and x
+
i (for each i ∈ N) among, respectively, the least and the greatest strategies in Xi
w.r.t. ºi. Let us show that X contains a simple strategy. Pick i ∈ N ; if g(x−i , x+−i) = q, then
g(x−i , x−i) = q for all x−i ∈ X−i, and we are home; if g(x−i , x+−i) = a, then g(xi, x+−i) = a for all
xi ∈ Xi, and we are home again. Thus, G is simple by Proposition 3.2.
To start the derivation of Statement 3, we define ri(xi) for i ∈ N and xi ∈ Xi as the rank
of xi w.r.t. Âi, hence ri(x′i) = ri(xi) ⇐⇒ x′i ∼i xi, in particular, ri(xi) = 0 ⇐⇒ xi ∼i x−i .
We denote mi = ri(x
+
i ). The definition (4.3) of ºi implies that there is an increasing mapping
γ : [0,m1]× [0,m2]→ {0, 1} such that g(xN) = a if and only if γ(r1(x1), r2(x2)) = 1.
Step 4.7.1. If i ∈ N , ξi ∈ [0,mi[, ξ−i ∈ [0,m−i[, γ(ξi, ξ−i) = q, and γ(ξi, ξ−i + 1) = a, then
γ(ξi+1, ξ−i) = a. If i ∈ N , ξi ∈]0,mi], ξ−i ∈ [0,m−i[, γ(ξi, ξ−i) = q, and γ(ξi, ξ−i+1) = a, then
γ(ξi − 1, ξ−i + 1) = q.
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Proof. By (4.3), there must be η−i ∈ [0,m−i] such that γ(ξi, η−i) = q while γ(ξi + 1, η−i) = a.
Neither η−i < ξ−i, nor η−i ≥ ξ−i+1 are compatible with the monotonicity of γ, hence η−i = ξ−i
and we are home. The proof of the second implication is dual.
It is immediately clear from (4.3) that no ξi ∈]0,mi[ is simple. Denoting η−i(ξi) = min{ξ−i |
γ(ξi, ξ−i) = a}, we obtain from Step 4.7.1 that ξi + η−i(ξi) does not depend on ξi, nor on i; we
denote the constant λq. Clearly, g(xN) = a ⇐⇒
∑
i∈N ri(xi) ≥ λq.
Now we consider a VV game form G¯ with the same N , A = {q, a, b}, q > a > b, µi =
mi+#Xi, λq just defined, λa =
∑
i∈N µi+1 and an arbitrary λb. To represent G as a fragment
of G¯, we order each strategy set, i.e., pick an arbitrary bijection oi : Xi → {1, . . . ,#Xi}; now
each strategy xi ∈ Xi is interpreted as putting ri(xi) balls at q, oi(xi) balls at a, and all the
rest at b. Clearly, a is never vetoed, hence b is never chosen and a is chosen if and only if q is
vetoed. Therefore, g coincides with the restriction of g¯ to XN .
Given Statement 2, we notice that (3.2) implies (4.1); then Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.2
imply Statement 1. The implication Statement 3 ⇒ Statement 1 immediately follows from
Proposition 4.5.
Example 4.8. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, player 1 choose rows, player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices.[
q a
q q
] [
a a
q a
]
Condition (4.1) obviously holds, but there is no simple strategy. Thus, the implication State-
ment 1 ⇒ Statement 2 from Theorem 4.7 does not hold when n > 2 even if #A = 2. The
invalidity of the converse implication when #A > 2 even if n = 2 is shown by Example 4.6.
It is not difficult to check that the game form is an almost potential one; however, it cannot
be represented as a perfect information game form.
Example 4.9. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, player 1 choose rows, player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices:q a aq q q
q q q

q a aq q a
q q a

q a aq a a
q q a

a a aa a a
q q a
.
Conditions (4.1) are easy to check, hence the game form is totally tight. Suppose it can be
represented as the fragment of a VV game form. Since the roles of a and q are perfectly
symmetric, we may, without restricting generality, assume q > a; therefore, a is selected when
and only when q is vetoed. We denote xsi the number of black balls cast at q by player i(∈ {1, 2})
when using s-th strategy, counting upwards for player 1 and from the left to right for player 2.
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The rightmost matrix shows that x21−x11 > x22−x12; the leftmost, that x31−x21 > x32−x22; therefore,
x31−x11 > x32−x12. On the other hand, each of the middle matrices shows that x32−x12 > x31−x11.
Thus, the implication Statement 1 ⇒ Statement 3 from Theorem 4.7 does not hold when
n > 2 even if #A = 2.
Theorem 4.10. Every VV game form has an almost unrestricted FCP.
Proof. For every xN , yN ∈ XN , a ∈ A, t ∈ D, and I ∈ N , we define:
ε(a, xN) = max{κ(a, xN)− λa, 0}; E(xN) =
∑
a∈A
ε(a, xN)
(over-vetoing at a and total over-vetoing);
β(a, xN) = max{λa − κ(a, xN), 0}
(“empty slots” at a);
C(xN) = {b ∈ A |
∑
a>b
β(a, xN) < 2 & ε(b, xN) = 0} 3 g(xN); B(xN) = x−1N (C(xN))
(the sets of outcomes that are “close enough” to being selected and of the balls cast there);
δ(xN , yN ; t) =

0, if yN(t) = xN(t);
+∞, if yN(t) 6= xN(t) & ε(yN(t), yN) > 0;
d(yN(t), xN(t)) + 1, otherwise [with d defined by (3.4)];
(4.5a)
δx−I (xI , yI) =
∑
t∈DI
δ(xN , (yI , x−I); t). (4.5b)
For every I ∈ N , the family of quasidistances on XI defined in (4.5) generates an admissible
change relation `I , hence an admissible improvement relation B> in every derivative game. The
notion of admissibility combines the ideas from the proofs of Theorems 3.6 and 3.13: the players
shift as few balls as possible and move them as short a distance as possible; first of all, however,
they avoid over-vetoing at any cost.
Given a list of utilities 〈υi〉i∈N , we define
P (xN) = −
∑
t∈B(xN )
υν(t)(xN(t));
yN Â xN ­
[∀a ∈ A [ε(a, xN) ≥ ε(a, yN)] & (E(xN) > E(yN) or B(xN) ⊂ B(yN) or
[B(xN) = B(yN) & P (xN) < P (yN)]
) ]
. (4.6)
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The rest of the proof consists in showing that Â is an order potential for the admissible improve-
ment relation B>. It seems worthwhile to describe it informally: we monitor the over-vetoing at
each outcome, what balls are cast at C(xN) and who cast them; one strategy profile “dominates”
another if either there is a strict decrease in over-vetoing, or more balls come under observation,
or the balls are the same but the players try to veto worse (for them) outcomes.
Let xN , yN ∈ XN , I ∈ N , y−I = x−I , a = g(xN), b = g(yN), and D∗ = {t ∈ D | xN(t) 6=
yN(t)}. We have to show that yN Â xN in every derivative game where yN B>I xN .
By the definition of g, two things are necessary and sufficient for b to be selected at yN : b
must not be vetoed; everything above b must be vetoed. Formally:
β(b, yN) > 0 = ε(b, yN); (4.7a)
∀c > b [β(c, yN) = 0]. (4.7b)
We start with the demonstration of the possibility to switch from a to b without any increase
in over-vetoing. If β(b, xN) = 0, then ε(b, xN) + 1 balls must be taken from b to ensure (4.7a);
Inequality (4.4) ensures that the total number of “empty slots,”
∑
c∈A β(c, xN), is no less than
that. Therefore, the members of I can make (4.7a) fulfilled without creating over-vetoing.
(Since coalition I was able to make b selected, #x−1I (b) must be large enough.) Similarly, no
over-vetoing could help ensuring (4.7b). Since yI is the least cost way to switch from a to b, there
must be δx−I (xI , yI) < +∞. Therefore, there was no increase in over-vetoing at any outcome
c ∈ A when xN was replaced with yN , i.e.
∀c ∈ A [ε(c, yN) ≤ ε(c, xN)]. (4.8)
Secondly, if ε(b, xN) > 0, we have E(yN) < E(xN), hence yN Â xN and we are home. The
same conclusion is reached if ε(c, yN) < ε(c, xN) for any c ∈ A. In the following, we assume that
ε(b, xN) = 0; (4.9a)
∀c ∈ A [ε(c, yN) = ε(c, xN)]. (4.9b)
Thirdly, (4.7) immediately implies b ∈ C(yN). The final argument depends on whether b > a
or a > b.
A. Let b > a. By (4.9a), shifting just one ball from b is enough to get that outcome selected;
therefore, D∗ = {t∗} and xN(t∗) = b. The minimality of δ(xN , yN ; t∗) implies that the ball goes
to the nearest empty slot, which is a, i.e., yN(t
∗) = a. It is clear now that B(yN) = B(xN) and
P (yN) − P (xN) = υν(t∗)(b) − υν(t∗)(a) > 0. Therefore, yN Â xN by the last disjunctive term in
(4.6).
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B. Let b < a. We again consider two alternatives. If b /∈ C(xN), then every c ∈ C(xN) is
above b, hence C(xN) ⊂ C(yN), hence B(xN) ⊂ B(yN) because at least one ball was added at
a ∈ C(yN). Therefore, yN Â xN by the second disjunctive term in (4.6).
Now let b ∈ C(xN); then β(a, xN) = 1 and β(c, xN) = 0 for every c such that b < c < a.
Therefore, D∗ = {t∗}, yN(t∗) = a, and xN(t∗) ≤ b. If xN(t∗) = b, then B(yN) = B(xN) and
P (yN)−P (xN) > 0, hence yN Â xN , exactly as in the case of b > a. This alternative must hold
if β(b, xN) = 0. Finally, let xN(t
∗) = c < b, hence β(b, xN) > 0, hence c /∈ C(xN). We see that
t∗ ∈ B(yN) \B(xN), hence yN Â xN exactly as in the previous paragraph.
Example 4.6 above shows that the adjective “almost unrestricted” in Theorem 4.10 cannot
be dropped; actually, both improvements by player 1 there create over-vetoing.
In principle, the notion of voting by veto can be extended by considering other rules for the
selection of a single non-vetoed outcome at every strategy profile. Assuming that (4.4) holds as
an equality, the existence of a strong equilibrium can be shown for any g (Moulin, 1983). Under
a strict inequality, even Nash consistency is not ensured.
Example 4.11. Let A = {a, b, c, d}, N = {1, 2}, every µ and λ be equal to 1. It is convenient
to assume that each player just chooses an outcome, xi, to veto. Let g be defined as follows: If
{x1, x2} ⊆ {c, d}, then g(xN) = a if x1 = x2 and g(xN) = b if x1 6= x2; otherwise, g(xN) = d if d
is not vetoed whereas g(xN) = c if d is vetoed. The rule produces this matrix:
d d d c
d d d c
d d a b
c c b a
.
Player 1 cannot ensure g(xN) ∈ {a, c}; player 2 cannot ensure g(xN) ∈ {b, d}. Therefore, the
game form is not Nash consistent (Gurvich, 1975, 1988; Moulin, 1976).
It remains unclear to what extent Theorem 4.10 could be generalized to other mappings
g. So far, an almost unrestricted FCP was only established for a rather peculiar tie-breaking
procedure suggested by Gol’berg and Gurvich (1986), which is only defined when (4.4) holds as
an equality. Example 2.1d is generated by that procedure.
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